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Abstract
We bring a novel, longitudinal, perspective to an ongoing series of influential papers that investigates
the relationship between housework, marital bargaining, and spousal resources. For the first time, we
believe, in this long debate, we combine a longitudinal perspective with a measure of resources—
human capital—that provides an indicator of the likely economic bargaining power of the non-
employed, thereby enabling their inclusion in analysis. We use longitudinal fixed-effects models to ad-
dress the relationship between housework hours and spousal resources based on yearly couples’ data
from the nationally representative British Household Panel Study (N ¼ 6,541 couples). Using the meas-
ure of human capital, we find change in wives’ own human capital to be the most important factor
determining housework for both spouses, and no evidence for gender deviance neutralization. We con-
clude it is women’s resources that are the critical determining factor in bargaining over housework.
Over the past 20 years a series of influential papers have
investigated the relationship between couples’ earned in-
come and housework (e.g. Brines, 1994; Greenstein,
2000; Bittman et al., 2003; Evertsson and Nermo, 2004;
Gupta, 2007; Gupta and Ash, 2008; Killewald and
Gough, 2010). The assumption underpinning this litera-
ture is that spousal economic resources are instrumental
in determining the outcome of spousal marital bargain-
ing over desirable and undesirable activities. One of the
more controversial findings to emerge suggested that
women who earn more than their husbands do more
housework to compensate for their non-normative eco-
nomic status, and that, for the same reasons, un-
employed husbands do less housework than equivalent
men in employment (the so-called ‘gender deviance neu-
tralization’ effect).
In this article we use nationally representative, yearly
longitudinal British couples’ data to assess whether
change in partners’ relative or absolute resources is
associated with change in their housework time, or the
couples’ share of housework. We combine this longitu-
dinal perspective with a measure of resources—human
capital—that, very unusually in this literature, provides
an indicator of the underlying marital bargaining power
of the non-employed, enabling their inclusion in
analysis.
The majority of the sociological literature on this
topic has been based on cross-sectional analysis. The
cross-sectional approach, however, is dogged by prob-
lems of selection bias. Longitudinal data allow infer-
ences of causal rather than simply associative
relationships to be made with greater confidence.
A measure of human capital serves as a useful extension
to the standard analysis of current earnings as the meas-
ure of spousal economic resources. In particular, it en-
ables the assessment of the contributions of non-earners
(e.g. women or men who are unemployed or on parental
leave) to housework. Using this wider measure of
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economically salient resources, we test the effect of
spousal absolute and relative resources on housework
time, comparing our results to previous research in this
tradition that has addressed the relative strengths of
marital bargaining theory against gender deviance
neutralization.
Review of Literature
The relationship between housework, marital power,
and spousal relative resources was first advanced by
Blood and Wolfe (1960), and the continuing importance
of housework as an indicator of marital power was
underlined by Davis and Greenstein in their editors’
introductory article to an entire issue of Journal of
Family Theory and Review devoted to the topic of
household labour (Davis and Greenstein, 2013). The
studies referred to in the review of literature below took
housework as their dependent measure in an effort to
determine how the spousal division of this undesirable,
feminine-associated, activity can be best explained by
the competing hypotheses of economic bargaining or
gender deviance neutralization (see, for example,
Bittman et al., 2003; Gupta, 2007).
Economic bargaining theory suggested that the allo-
cation of housework depends on the distribution of
marital power between spouses, which in turn depends
upon their relative economic resources (i.e. their ‘eco-
nomic dependency’). Spouses can use economically
based bargaining power to reduce their own time in
housework, and increase that of their partner. In con-
trast, the theoretical base for gender deviance neutraliza-
tion lies in the doing gender perspective (West and
Zimmerman, 1987). Within this perspective, women
‘display’ their gender by doing the bulk of feminine-
defined tasks such as routine housework, while men ‘dis-
play’ theirs by doing none or very little of it. Gender de-
viance neutralization occurs when men who were not
fulfilling their normative breadwinner role compensate
by emphasizing their masculinity through the minimal
performance of housework, while women who earn sub-
stantially more than their spouses compensate by
emphasizing their femininity through the over-
performance of housework. In fact, as Bittman et al.
(2003) point out, the two hypotheses are not necessarily
mutually exclusive. The fact that this debate is still ac-
tive is testimony to the importance of this topic to our
understanding of the processes of marital bargaining.
Earlier papers in this area suggested that there was a
linear dependence between relative spousal earned in-
comes (the usual measure of economic dependency) and
the division of housework within couples, supporting the
suppositions of economic bargaining theory. In general,
the higher the earned income of a member of the couple
relative to their spouse, the less housework they per-
formed (e.g. Brines, 1994; Presser, 1994; Greenstein,
2000). But at the same time highly influential evidence
was also found for a gender deviance neutralization ef-
fect—so-called by Bittman et al. (2003). Brines’s analysis
of Panel Study of Income Dynamics data from 1985
found a curvilinear relationship between relative income
and men’s housework hours (based on the squared term
of relative income). This was interpreted to mean that
husbands who were more economically dependent did
less housework than others, as a means of emphasizing
their masculinity. She found no support for the existence
of any complementary behaviour by breadwinner wives
(women who earn substantially more than their spouses
emphasizing their femininity through the over-
performance of housework). However, using the 1987/
1988 National Survey of Families and Households
(NSFH), Greenstein (2000) concluded that both econom-
ically dependent men and breadwinner wives tended to
neutralize their deviant identity by undertaking less
housework (in the case of economically dependent men)
or more housework (in the case of breadwinner wives).
These analyses lent strong support to gender theory by
seeming to demonstrate that in certain structural situ-
ations the power of gender can override the power of
money.
Studies, thereafter, have produced mixed results.
Using the Australian 1992 Time Use Survey, Bittman
et al. (2003) again found curvilinear relationships, indi-
cating gender deviance neutralization, between relative
spousal earnings and housework hours in the case of
women but not in the case of men. Only among couples
with breadwinner wives was the gender deviance neu-
tralization effect evident. A comparative, quasi-
longitudinal, perspective was introduced by Evertsson
and Nermo (2004), who compared Swedish and US cou-
ples in the period between 1973 and 2000 using Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the Swedish
Level of Living Survey data. They reported persistent
evidence of gender deviance neutralization only among
women in the United States. They followed up with a
similar study of a more limited number of surviving
Swedish couples from the Level of Living Survey who
had remained together over the period 1991–2000
(Evertsson and Nermo, 2007), finding that increases in
all three of their measures of a woman’s relative re-
sources (education, occupation, and earnings) were
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linearly associated with decreases in her share of house-
work, and that this decrease mostly occurred through in-
creases in the male partners’ housework hours.
However, they again found no evidence for a gender de-
viance neutralization effect in the Swedish data. Kan’s
(2008) analysis of pooled cross-sectional British
Household Panel Data over the period 1993–2003 (uti-
lizing an earlier version of the human capital measure
described in this article) found support for a negative
linear effect of relative income on housework hours,
but no conclusive evidence for gender deviance
neutralization.
Following the intense interest generated by the find-
ings on gender deviance neutralization—frequently mis-
interpreted in the media to mean that high-earning
professional women with demanding full-time jobs also
do an excess of compensatory housework—more recent
research has focused on an exploration of gender devi-
ance neutralization among full-time employed couples
(to overcome the problem of missing values on the earn-
ings variable). Using NSFH data, Gupta (2007) intro-
duced a new dimension into the argument. While the
main variable used to explain husbands and wives’
housework hours in the literature to date had been rela-
tive spousal earned incomes (‘who earns more’), Gupta
asked what the effect of including the absolute incomes
of husbands and wives would be. He found that the rela-
tive earnings of full-time employed women contributed
little to the explanation of housework hours when their
absolute earnings were also included in the model. He
concluded that it was these women’s absolute, rather
than their relative, earnings that determine their house-
work hours, dubbing this the women’s autonomy model
(Gupta, 2007; Gupta and Ash, 2008). The argument
goes that, for full-time employed women, higher abso-
lute, rather than relative, earnings are the most import-
ant factor in being able to get out of doing the
housework. He also noted that the simplest potential ex-
planation for this is that such women use their earnings
to purchase substitutes for their own domestic work.
However, recent research has shown this ‘outsourcing’
explanation to be something of a red herring, at least in
respect to housework. One of the main findings, from
several countries, is that relatively few households (less
than 10 per cent) outsource routine domestic tasks (as
opposed to child care—Sullivan and Gershuny, 2013;
Bittman, Matheson and Meagher, 1999; de Ruijter,
2004; Stancanelli and Stratton, 2010). Moreover, out-
sourcing does not seem to have a strong impact in multi-
variate analysis on women’s overall hours of housework
(Sullivan and Gershuny, 2013; Killewald, 2011).
Recently, in a continuation of the debate, but again
analysing only full-time employed couples, Killewald
and Gough found no longitudinal relationship in the
PSID data between changes in women’s relative earnings
and their housework (Killewald and Gough, 2010).
However, they demonstrated a non-linear association
between changes in women’s absolute earnings and
housework, arguing that previous findings of a curvilin-
ear relationship between relative earnings and house-
work could be accounted for by a misspecification of the
relationship between women’s absolute earnings and
their housework time as linear. The combination of the
importance of women’s absolute earnings, as demon-
strated by Gupta (2007), and of their non-linear rela-
tionship with housework hours, as demonstrated by
Killewald and Gough (2010), could be sufficient to ac-
count for the contrary findings of Schneider (2011) who,
using American Time Use Study data, once more found
evidence for a curvilinear relationship between relative
earned income and wife’s housework hours. For a more
comprehensive review of the literature on gender devi-
ance neutralization (see Sullivan, 2011).
The question of whether to include non-earners in
the analysis of economic bargaining power has been a
thorny question through this debate, and has led some
recent researchers to include in their analyses only those
couples where both spouses were in full-time employ-
ment (e.g. Gupta, 2007; Killewald and Gough, 2010),
leaving others to assess the contribution of unemployed
spouses to housework separately (e.g. Gough and
Killewald, 2011). The majority of analyses have taken
the option of including non-employed spouses, but ac-
corded them an economic resource score of zero. While
this may be the correct treatment if one adopts the
narrowest economic definition of the determinants of
marital bargaining power, the sociological tradition of
relative resource theory presents a wider perspective on
marital power, in which current earnings represent just
one aspect of a wide range of potential resources which
may be brought into play in couples’ bargaining proc-
esses (Blood and Wolf, 1960). We, therefore, argue that
for certain groups of people, in particular women who
have taken time out of employment to care for children,
a measure of human capital, based on a range of
market-related factors (such as educational achievement
and employment/occupational histories), is likely to
more accurately reflect their real marital bargaining
power. For example, a highly paid career woman on ma-
ternity leave is likely to be in a more powerful position
to bargain within her relationship than one who has
very little employment experience and who has been
continuously unemployed. And if her marriage should
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end, her accrued human capital resources would put her
in a relatively strong economic position (certainly stron-
ger than that of her counterpart, despite their equal zero
current earnings), a factor that, according to standard
divorce-threat bargaining theory (Lundburg and Pollak,
1993), should also have the effect of increasing her cur-
rent marital bargaining power.
The measure of human capital that we employ, fol-
lowing the sociological approach, is based upon a wider
definition of economically salient spousal resources than
current earnings alone. Using this measure we are able
to assess the relationship between spousal relative re-
sources and housework hours across the whole range of
the observed spousal resources distribution, including
those couples where one partner is not in paid employ-
ment. A few researchers (e.g. Presser, 1994; Evertsson
and Nermo, 2004, 2007) have previously included other
more inclusive measures of relative resources in their
analyses (e.g. relative spousal educational levels).
However, because these other measures were directly
compared with relative earnings within the same mod-
els, the analyses of these papers did not include the non-
employed, a group that, as we show below, represents a
very substantial sub-group of the population.
Data and Method
The British Household Panel Study (BHPS) is a large-
scale nationally representative annual panel survey
based on interviews with all adult members of a ran-
dom sample of British households. The original BHPS
sample consisted of 5,050 households containing 9,092
interviewed adults at Wave 1 (1991), a response rate of
74 per cent of eligible households, with re-interview
rates rising to well above 90 per cent. Panel data are
collected together with retrospective information on
employment and other circumstances prior to the start
of the panel.
For our purposes the BHPS has a number of advan-
tages. First, the collection of information from all adult
household members permits the direct calculation of
couples’ relative resources and contributions to domestic
labour. Secondly, detailed current and retrospective in-
formation on employment, occupation, and wage data
allows us to use historical and other accumulated per-
sonal characteristics to construct a measure of econom-
ically salient human capital. Finally, panel data can give
us an insight into causal relationships between changes
in respondents’ characteristics and behaviour.
The sample used in this study consisted of couples
aged 20–59 who defined themselves as married or living
as married. The point about a sample of couples is that
relative resources may be calculated for actual couples.
For simplicity, we have referred throughout to these
couples as ‘wives and husbands’, rather than the more
cumbersome ‘female partner’ and ‘male partner’.
Consistent with previous research, we excluded from
our analyses same-sex couples, those in full-time educa-
tion, and the long-term sick/disabled. Following these
exclusions, we arrived at a total sample size of 27,413
observations from 3,810 couples for the analyses based
on human capital. For those analyses where the main ex-
planatory variable was based on earned income, there
are two options in terms of sample selection. The first is
to include the non-employed, according them a score of
zero—a strategy which we have argued risks distorting
the measurement of their actual bargaining power. The
second option, as in most of the recent literature, is to
include only employed couples. We chose the second op-
tion for our models based on earned income—selecting
those couples where both partner had some earned in-
come (i.e. including the part-time employed but exclud-
ing the non-employed). This results in a smaller sample
size of 19,848 observations from 3,163 couples.
Variables
Ranges, means, and standard deviations for the vari-
ables described in this section are shown in Table 1A. In
most previous research on this topic the dependent
measure of time spent in housework has been derived
from a question asking respondents to estimate their
weekly hours in housework (or in various components
of housework). The two main data sources used in this
area of research have been the PSID and the NSFH be-
cause of their sample size and coverage of a large range
of socio-economic and demographic variables—advan-
tages which are shared by the BHPS. However, a few
studies in this area (e.g. Bittman et al., 2003; Connelly
and Kimmel, 2007; Schneider, 2011) have based their
analyses on time-diary information, which is generally
acknowledged to yield a more accurate measure of time
spent in specific activities (Robinson, 1985).
Nevertheless, we considered that for the purposes of this
study the advantage of having panel couple data from
the BHPS—including retrospective education and em-
ployment histories and permitting longitudinal ana-
lysis—outweighed the disadvantages associated with the
use of stylized questions. The BHPS question about
housework time is similar to that from the PSID:
‘About how many hours do you spend on housework
in an average week, such as time spent cooking, cleaning
and doing the laundry?’
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The focus of this measure is on the core, routine, as-
pects of housework that are traditionally feminine-
defined, and widely regarded as undesirable. The main
advantage that the BHPS has over the PSID is that the
information is collected directly from both partners: in
the PSID one partner (which, at least in the past, was
usually the man) reports on the hours of housework con-
tributed by their spouse, a methodology generally re-
garded as problematic (see Bryant et al., 2003). The
American Time Use Survey (ATUS), similarly, only col-
lects diary information on time use from one member of
each household, with the result that no measure of the
relative share of housework is calculable.
With respect to the independent variables, all the
papers referred to above have used the calculation of ‘in-
come transfer’ introduced originally by Sorensen and
McLanahan (1987) as their primary explanatory vari-
able. This measure deducts one spousal income from the
other and divides the result by the total combined spou-
sal income, creating an index of relative spousal earned
income. However, as we have argued, the absence of a
current wage for people who are not in employment
does not necessarily mean that they have zero economic
bargaining power. The gap between a measure of rela-
tive earned income and actual bargaining power is likely
to be most acute for women because of the burden of
caring responsibilities. At any one point in time a wom-
an’s current income may, therefore, represent a substan-
tial underestimation of her economically salient
resources as measured through her education, occupa-
tion, and employment history.
To illustrate the extent of the omission of the non-
employed from analyses of the relationship between
relative resources and housework, Table 1 shows the
percentages of non-employed wives and husbands
across the distribution of relative spousal human cap-
ital. At the extreme end of the distribution where wives’
human capital was at its highest relative to their hus-
bands’, 26 per cent of husbands were not in employ-
ment. The equivalent percentage for wives at the
opposite end of the distribution of relative human cap-
ital was 36 per cent not in employment. The
implication is that over one quarter of husbands and a
third of wives at these points of the distribution of rela-
tive spousal human capital have been treated in previ-
ous earnings-based analyses as either (1) excluded or
(2) having zero resources. The impact of this exclusion
and its effect on interpretation are discussed below,
with reference to Table 2.
In response to these considerations, the measure of
spousal relative resources that we estimate (human cap-
ital) takes into account a range of market-related factors,
such as educational achievement and employment/occu-
pational histories. Support for this combinatory ap-
proach comes from Evertsson and Nermo (2007), who
compared spousal education, job status, and earned in-
come as measures of relative resources, finding for all
three measures very similar patterns of relationship to
spousal housework hours. The human capital measure, a
continuously scaled indicator designed originally as a
tool to investigate patterns of differentiation in life chan-
ces, is calculated from retrospective (recall) and prospect-
ive (panel study) evidence on individuals’ educational
qualifications, recent experience in employment and
non-employment, current wage (for those in employ-
ment), and present or previous occupational membership
using data from all the currently available waves of the
BHPS (Gershuny, 2000; Kan and Gershuny, 2006). The
calculation of this measure is described in greater detail
in Appendix B.
The relative human capital measure was calculated in
the standard way as the wife’s human capital score minus
that of her husband, divided by the overall combined
score of husband and wife. We followed the analytic
strategy of previous authors and controlled for other
demographic variables known to affect time spent in
housework: age of the respondent (and its squared term)
and the number of own children aged under 18 in the
household. For our cross-sectional comparison of the
spousal resource measures using the pooled panel data
we included a marker for survey wave and its squared
term, since recent years have shown a levelling-off of the
rate of decline in the proportion of domestic labour done
by women, leading some commentators to refer to a
Table 1. Percentage of wives and husbands not in employment by spousal relative human capital; BHPS 1992–2008
(pooled) sample













Per cent wives not in employment 36 25 17 13 8 27,034
Per cent husbands not in employment 3 6 11 17 26 27,034
Number (per cent) of observations 4,278 (16) 9,761 (36) 9,421 (35) 3,028 (11) 546 (2) 27,034
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slowing or stalling of the trend towards convergence (e.g.
England, 2010). We also included hours of paid work in
the model for earned income only. In the previous litera-
ture based on earned income, this variable has been
included as a test of ‘time availability’. However, there is
a serious problem with using paid work hours as a pre-
dictor of unpaid work hours, since we can assume that in
most household decision-making the two are jointly de-
pendent. This joint dependency will have the result of
creating significant model endogeneity. We include it
here, for the earned income model only, to provide a bet-
ter comparison with previous literature.
To test the robustness of the human capital measure
against other measures of spousal resources used in pre-
vious analyses, we compared the cross-sectional rela-
tionship between wives’ and husbands’ housework and
their human capital, with that based on earned income
and the wage rate (earned income divided by hours in
employment). We analysed pooled BHPS couples’ data
from the period 1992 to 2008 (the 1991 wave did not
include a question on housework hours), using ordinary
least squares regression to compare our results to previ-
ous research. For the longitudinal analyses we used
fixed-effects regression, modelling change in wives’ and
husbands’ housework hours by changes in absolute and
relative human capital across the same waves of the
BHPS panel. A year-on-year change model calculated as
a robustness check produced very similar outcomes to
the fixed-effects model, giving us more confidence that
other period-effect changes over the period analysed,
such as changes in gender expectations or divorce rates,
did not significantly affect our findings.
Findings
Cross-Sectional Comparison of Human Capital
with Other Resources Measures
Table 2 shows regression statistics and coefficients
from models comparing the effects of different meas-
ures of spousal economic resources on housework
hours. Note first the differences in the number of ob-
servations. After excluding couples where one or both
spouses were non-employed, the models for earned in-
come and the wage rate were based on 7,500 fewer
observations than the model for human capital. In
terms of model fit (R2), there was not a great differ-
ence between the models. However, as we have noted,
the earned income model not only excludes a substan-
tial proportion of the population but is also likely to
suffer from model endogeneity, which would
Table 2. OLS regression of housework hours on different measures of resources: BHPS 1992–2008 (pooled)
Wives’ housework hours Husbands’ housework hours
Earned incomea Wage ratea Human capitala Earned incomea Wage ratea Human capitala
Wife’s resources 0.01*** 0.32*** 3.43***
Wife’s resources squared 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.16***
Husband’s resources 0.00** 0.03 0.69***
Husband’s resources squared 0.00* 0.00* 0.04***
Relative resources 0.21 1.09** 2.18* 1.05*** 1.10*** 4.49***
Relative resources squared 0.67 0.62 0.86 0.36 0.27 2.85*
Hours employed/week 0.31*** 0.16***
Hours employed/week squared 0.26*** 0.13***
Number of children less than 18 years 2.04*** 3.19*** 3.56*** 0.49*** 0.48*** 0.49***
Wife’s age 0.46*** 0.26** 0.65*** 0.03 0.01 0.02
Wife’s age squared/100 0.32** 0.01 0.49*** 0.04 0.01 0.03
Wave 0.48*** 0.55*** 0.57*** 0.13** 0.14*** 0.15***
Wave squared/100 1.20*** 1.39*** 1.99*** 0.65*** 0.71*** 0.69***
Intercept 13.23*** 7.96*** 12.52*** 10.09*** 6.00** 9.08***
Model R2 0.25 0.18 0.22 0.03 0.02 0.04
Number of observations 19,848 19,848 27,413 19,848 19,848 27,413
Number of clusters 3,163 3,163 3,810 3,163 3,163 3,810
***P < 0.001, **P < 0.01, *P < 0.5.
aNote that all models include relative and own resources, and not spousal resources, due to the direct mathematical dependence between these three variables
(knowing two of them enables the calculation of the third). Relative resources represent the effect of spousal resources when own resources are held constant.
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artificially inflate the variance explained. The wage
rate measure of relative resources takes hours of em-
ployment out of the right-hand side of the equation.
The effect is to reduce the variance explained; R2s for
this model were somewhat lower for both husbands
and wives than in the model including earned income.
The human capital model, however, is conceptually
more akin to that for wage rate, yet its explanatory
power in relation to time spent in housework was
greater. The reason is that this model contains a sub-
stantially larger number of observations (reflecting the
inclusion of the non-employed population). The inclu-
sion of this group enables the assessment of whether
there is indeed a monotonic relationship between rela-
tive resources and housework hours at the extreme
ends of the spousal resources distribution.
The signs of the coefficients for the measures of abso-
lute resources are for the most part consistent across the
measures—both husbands and wives with higher abso-
lute resources spent less time in housework than those
with lower resources. There was an interesting differ-
ence in the model coefficients for women and men, how-
ever, that resonates with more recent findings from the
previous literature. Across the models, the negative coef-
ficient for own absolute resources was larger for wives
than for husbands, while the effect of relative resources
appeared to be larger for husbands than for wives. Due
to the mathematical dependency between the terms, in
the model for husband’s housework time, we may infer
the effect of wife’s resources from the relative resources
term (i.e. while holding his own resources constant), and
vice versa. These results, therefore, indicate that the
wife’s own resources have a greater effect on her hus-
band’s housework time than his resources do on hers,
and her housework time is more affected by her own re-
sources than by her husband’s.
The positive squared term of absolute own resources
for both wives and husbands appears to suggest a non-
linear relationship. The gender deviance neutralization
hypothesis has frequently been (mis)interpreted as mean-
ing that well-off professional wives do increased com-
pensatory amounts of housework, and that men with
very little economic resources emphasize their masculin-
ity by doing correspondingly little housework—and at
first sight there would appear to be some support for
that idea in this finding. However, since the coefficients
of a regression line predict values of the dependent vari-
able according to a mathematical relationship continu-
ing beyond the observed values, it is never clear from the
statistical significance of coefficients alone whether there
is in fact any turn-up within the observed range of the
independent variable, or merely a slowing in the rate of
decline. Below we graph regression predictions from the
coefficients for these models, giving us a picture of the
pattern of the relationship across the observed distribu-
tion of spousal relative resources.
The model coefficients for relative resources were
also as expected from previous literature. The greater
the relative resources of wives, the less housework they
did on average (negative coefficient) and the more their
partners did (positive coefficient). As noted above, for
husbands the association of housework with relative re-
sources were much more important than that for abso-
lute resources—the reverse of the finding for women.
The main thing of note in relation to the comparison
of measures was that the squared coefficients for the
earned income and human capital models for husbands
were different in sign. Although non-significant, for
those models based on earned income, there was a posi-
tive coefficient for earned income and a negative one for
earned income squared, interpreted in some of the previ-
ous literature as indicating a slowing down or reversal
of the increase in husband’s housework time as their fe-
male partner’s resources increased relative to their own.
In contrast, for the human capital model (which includes
unemployed husbands) the direction of the squared term
was positive, and was strongly statistically significant.
This suggests (but, as we have argued above, does not
absolutely demonstrate) a progressive rate of increase in
husband’s housework time as their partner’s resources
increase relative to their own. To see the effects of the
coefficients across the range of spousal relative resources
we need to examine the model predictions (see below).
Findings were consistent in the expected directions
for the control variables. There was an overall decrease
in the time spent on housework over the period 1992–
2008, which was greater for wives than for husbands
(although the statistically significant squared term does
imply a slowing of this decline in more recent years).
The number of children aged under 18 in the household
had a significantly positive effect on housework time for
both spouses, while age was positively associated with
housework for wives, but had no effect for husbands.
For the earned income model, employment hours had
the expected negative effect on housework time for both
wives and husbands.
As we have argued, rather than rely on the sign and
significance of model coefficients to assess the shape of
the relationship between housework hours and re-
sources, it is also important to graph the model predic-
tions. Figure 1 shows predicted housework hours for
husbands and wives based on wage rate and human cap-
ital. The model predictions are based on the coefficients
presented in Table 2, and instantiated for 1999 (midway
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through the 17 panel waves), for households with one
dependent child where the wife is aged 41. These instan-
tiations of the regression predictions for specific values
of the independent variables allow us to see graphically
the combined effect of the regression model coefficients
across the observed range of couple’s relative resources.
The horizontal axis shows the range of couples’ relative
resources (in deciles)—from couples in which the wife
was in the bottom decile and husbands in the top decile
on the left, to those where the wife was in the top decile
and husbands in the bottom decile on the right. The ver-
tical axis shows predicted housework hours. Note first
the contrasting curves for husbands and wives. As ex-
pected, as a wife’s relative resources increased they did
less housework, while their husbands did more. Also as
expected, the effect was more dramatic for wives than
for husbands. The outcome was that the total combined
time spent in housework by spouses was greater in those
households where husband’s resources substantially out-
strip those of their wife’s, than in those where the wife’s
resources substantially outstrip those of their husband’s.
This difference (previously noted by, for example,
Bianchi et al., 2006) reflects the fact that men have not
filled the domestic labour gap as women’s resources rise
and their housework hours decline. (Note, too, as
previously referred to, this effect is unlikely to be due to
the effect of the outsourcing of housework by wives
with higher resources than their spouses.)
There is no evidence in Figure 1 for a gender devi-
ance neutralization effect either for wives or husbands.
This is especially clear for the human capital model
where there is a pronounced upturn in husband’s domes-
tic work contributions at the extreme right-hand side of
the graph (where their relative resources are lowest),
compared to the much flatter (although still rising) line
for the wage rate model. It is also clear that where wives’
resources most significantly outstripped those of their
husbands (right side of the graph), their housework time
was the lowest of all.
In the difference between the modelled lines for rela-
tive human capital and relative wage rate we see the ef-
fects of the inclusion of the non-employed population.
At the extreme ends of the distribution of spousal rela-
tive human capital, employment rates are at their lowest
(see Table 1), and housework hours are correspondingly
longest for those partners with the lower level of human
capital. In the upturn of the modelled line for husband’s
relative human capital observable at the right-hand side
of the graph, we see the effects of the contribution to
housework made by men married to women who have
significantly more human capital than themselves. Over
one quarter of these men are non-earning (the majority
unemployed). For wives, the line for relative human cap-
ital is steeper than that for wage rate, starting at a higher
level of housework hours, because it also includes the
housework contributions of non-employed women.
However, it continues to decline steeply towards the
right-hand side of the graph (where wives’ human cap-
ital outstrips that of their husbands), dipping below the
line predicted from the wage rate model and reaching
near equality with the curve for husbands. The most
equal households in terms of the gender division of
housework were, therefore, found at the extreme end of
the relative spousal human capital distribution where
wives’ resources substantially outstrip those of their hus-
bands. To make this point more clearly, Figure 2 shows
model predictions for the couples’ percentage division of
housework (rather than their housework hours) based
on the same model variables, and instantiated in the
same way as in Figure 1 (models not shown). It can be
seen that there is a decline in the percentage of house-
work done by the woman in a couple as her relative re-
sources (both wage rate and human capital models)
increase. However, in the case of the human capital
model it falls dramatically where her human capital out-
strips that of her husband, to reach a level of around 55
per cent of housework at the extreme right-hand side of
Figure 1. Modelled predicted housework hours by couples’
relative human capital and wage rate deciles: BHPS 1992–2008
(pooled). Notes: Predicted values are based on the models
shown in Table 1, instantiated for 1999 (midway through the 17
panel waves), for couples with one dependent child where the
wife is aged 41, using mean values of the decile distribution of
resources for husbands and wives
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the graph where the woman’s human capital substan-
tially exceeds that of her husband.
Longitudinal Analyses; the Effect of Change in
Absolute and Relative Human Capital
Overall, in cross-sectional analysis, the human capital
measure performed as consistently as earned income as
a predictor of housework hours (found also by Kan,
2008), and the differences between the models were ex-
plicable by the inclusion of the non-employed popula-
tion for the human capital model. This gives us
confidence that the human capital is indeed capturing a
dimension of the economically salient resources that are
pertinent to marital bargaining. In the following ana-
lyses we utilize the 1992–2008 panel data of the BHPS
to provide longitudinal fixed-term regression estima-
tions for wives’ and husbands’ hours of housework from
human capital. The fixed-effects model is standardly
used with panel data to control for unobserved hetero-
geneity by removing time-invariant model components.
Note that, because of the way in which human capital
was measured, change in the measure of human capital
for both partners may reflect a number of different
events, such as changes in employment status, position
in job hierarchy, educational qualifications, or occupa-
tion. For a non-employed person it is most likely to in-
volve moving into some form of employment. (A similar
consideration applies to change analyses based on earn-
ings—for those employed a change in earnings can arise
from several quite distinct causes: a change of job, a
change in number of hours worked, a promotion or pay
cut, a seniority increment, etc.)
From Table 3 we see that the models predicting
change in housework hours do not account for as much
variance as the same cross-sectional models. This is ex-
pected, since the variance of change in housework hours
is considerably less than that in housework hours itself,
and it also excludes the effects of any unobserved
heterogeneity.
As was the case for the cross-sectional model shown
in Table 2, the coefficient for wife’s absolute human
capital is negative and strongly statistically significant.
Any increase in wives’ human capital was associated
with a substantial and significant decline in their house-
work hours. These findings provide a powerful, longitu-
dinal, example of the importance of changes in women’s
absolute economic resources in the determination of
their own housework. The equivalent effect for hus-
bands was less strong than in the cross-sectional model,
although it reaches statistical significance.
Overall, a noticeable gender difference in respect of
absolute and relative human capital is found in the lon-
gitudinal analysis that echoes the gender asymmetry of
the pooled cross-sectional results. For husbands, a
change in relative spousal human capital had a stronger
effect on their housework hours than a change in their
own human capital, whereas for wives a change in their
own human capital proved to be the only statistically
significant resource change. The implication is that
changes in women’s absolute resources are the primary
driving force behind changes in the time that both part-
ners spend doing housework.
As expected from existing literature, the birth of a
child was also associated with a significant increase in
the number of hours spent on housework, especially for
wives.
Instantiations of the Longitudinal Model
Figure 3a and b shows model predictions from the fixed-
effect regression coefficients of Table 3. These instanti-
ations of the regression predictions for specific values of
the independent variables allow us to see graphically the
combined effect of the regression coefficients across the
observed range of couple’s relative resources.
Figure 2. Modelled predicted relative housework hours by cou-
ples’ relative human capital and wage rate deciles: BHPS 1992–
2008 (pooled). Notes: (i) Predicted values were based on mod-
els including the same variables as those shown in Table 1, but
using wife’s share of housework hours as the dependent vari-
able (not shown). (ii) Predictions were instantiated for 1999, for
couples with one dependent child where the wife is aged 41,
using mean values of the decile distribution of resources for
husbands and wives
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Predicted housework hours for women and men in
couples with different relative human capital are shown,
under different conditions of change in absolute and
relative human capital. The models are again instanti-
ated for 1999 (midway through the 17 waves of the
panel) for men and women aged 41 with one dependent
child in the household. The horizontal axis shows the
range (in deciles) of couples with different relative re-
sources—from women in the bottom decile/men in the
top decile on the left to women in the top decile/men in
the bottom decile on the right. The vertical axis shows
predicted housework hours. The trend lines shown in
the body of the graph are instantiations (model predic-
tions) of housework hours. They show ‘before’ and
‘after’ levels of housework associated with changes in
human capital, for wives (Figure 3a) and husbands
(Figure 3b), respectively. One line of each graph shows
the situation of no change in human capital over the
panel waves. The other lines demonstrate the effect on
housework hours of a positive and negative change of
one decile of human capital for wives and husbands,
respectively.
First, there is again no evidence in these instanti-
ations for an effect of gender deviance neutralization.
The trend lines are essentially linear in character, with
women’s housework hours declining steadily, and men’s
Table 3. Fixed-effect longitudinal regression: wives’ house-
work hours (Model 1) and husbands’ housework hours
(Model 2). BHPS 1992–2008








Wife’s human capital 1.63***
Wife’s human capital squared 0.09***
Husband’s human capital 0.27*
Husband’s human capital squared 0.01
Relative human capital 1.29 1.58**
Relative human capital squared 0.68 1.05
Number of children <18 2.98*** 0.23**
Wife’s age 0.09 0.36*
Wife’s age squared/100 0.43** 0.14*
Wave 0.23 0.16
Wave squared/100 2.13*** 0.58**
Intercept 24.01** 16.96***
R2 within 0.08 0.01
R2 between 0.02 0.00
Number of observations 27,413 27,413
Number of clusters 3,810 3,810
***P < 0.001, **P < 0.01, *P < 0.5.
aNote that the models include relative and own resources, and not spousal re-
sources, due to the direct mathematical dependence between these three vari-
ables (knowing two of them enables the calculation of the third). Relative




Figure 3. (a) Changes in wives’ housework hours by changes in
couples’ relative human capital deciles: BHPS 1992–2008. Note:
Predictions were based on the models shown in Table 3, and
instantiated for 1999 (midway through the 17 panel waves), for
couples with one dependent child where the wife is aged 41,
using mean values of the decile distribution of human capital
for husbands and wives. (b) Changes in husbands’ housework
hours by changes in couples’ relative human capital deciles:
BHPS 1992–2008. Note: Predictions were based on the models
shown in Table 3, and instantiated for 1999 (midway through
the 17 panel waves), for couples with one dependent child
where the wife is aged 41, using mean values of the decile dis-
tribution of human capital for husbands and wives
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increasing steadily, through the range of relative spousal
human capital. A clear difference, however, is evident in
the effects for husbands and wives of changes in human
capital. For wives (Figure 3a) it is clear that an increase
in her partner’s human capital of one decile led to very
little increase in her housework hours across the range
of joint human capital deciles (in fact one can barely dis-
tinguish this line from that for no change). In contrast,
an increase in a wife’s own human capital led to a pro-
nounced decrease in her housework hours across the
range of couples’ joint human capital deciles. This asym-
metry reflects the far greater importance in the deter-
mination of a woman’s housework hours of a change in
her own resources as opposed to a change in her part-
ner’s (i.e. the couple’s relative) resources.
For husbands (Figure 3b) the picture was the mirror
image of that for wives. There was little change in hus-
bands’ housework hours when their own human capital
increased by one decile. However, for that part of the
distribution of relative spousal human capital where
wives’ human capital exceeded that of their husbands’,
the effect of an increase of one decile in a wife’s human
capital was associated with a clear increase in her hus-
band’s housework hours. This asymmetry can be seen in
the coefficients of Table 3, Model 2, in the relatively
weak and barely significant coefficient associated with
change in husbands’ own human capital, compared to
the stronger and more statistically significant coefficient
for change in relative human capital.
Concluding Discussion
In this article we have presented a fresh perspective on
questions which have engaged researchers interested in
the relationship between marital bargaining and house-
work over a couple of decades. We used large nationally
representative yearly panel data to overcome the prob-
lems of unobserved heterogeneity that affect cross-
sectional research, and to give greater confidence to in-
ferences of causal rather than simply associative rela-
tionships. We also used a measure of human capital to
address the relationship with housework over the whole
range of the distribution of spousal resources, including
where one or both spouses are not in employment. The
inclusion of a wider range of economically salient re-
sources within the human capital measure, and the in-
clusion thereby of the non-employed population, gives
us, we argue, a truer picture of marital bargaining power
in relation to housework than earned income alone.
In cross-sectional robustness checks we found that
this measure produced results that were not just
largely consistent with, but in terms of model fit also
closely matched, a model based on earnings—the con-
ventional measure of spousal economic resources. This
shows that the human capital measure, more inclusive
of the entire population than earned income, does in-
deed capture key variation in spousal resources which
have been found to be important in the previous
literature.
The key addition to the existing literature arising
from comparing predicted housework time from cross-
sectional models based on human capital (and therefore
including the non-employed population) with those
based on earnings (in the form of the wage rate), is to
show that husbands in couples with the most extreme
relative human capital distribution in favour of the
woman in fact contribute very substantially to house-
work, and substantially more than in the model based
on wage rate (see Figure 1). Equally, wives in couples
with this distribution of human capital do substantially
less housework than in the wage rate model. Indeed, in
such couples the division of housework time approaches
equity (Figure 2). This result shows the effect of the add-
ition of the non-employed to the analysis. It strongly
supports bargaining theory and shows no evidence at
the cross-sectional level for gender deviance neutraliza-
tion behaviour by husbands who are the most disadvan-
taged, or wives who are the most advantaged, in terms
of their relative human capital.
The main substantive conclusion from the longitu-
dinal models using the human capital measure concerns
the effect of changes in absolute and relative spousal re-
sources in the prediction of housework. Here, there was
again an important difference between the models for
husband’s and wives’ housework time. Change in wives’
own human capital proved to have a strong effect on
their own housework time, while the effect of a change
in relative resources was less convincingly significant.
These findings support the cross-sectional results of
Gupta (2007), and the longitudinal analyses of
Killewald and Gough (2010). These papers, however,
were based on analyses of a more limited group of the
population—full-time earner couples—to avoid the
problem of missing values on earnings and hours in
employment.
For husbands, on the other hand, a change in their
wives’ human capital appeared to be more significant
than a change in their own. Our overall conclusion from
the longitudinal models is that it is women’s resources
that are the critical determining element in the outcome
of bargaining over an undesirable activity such as house-
work. Men’s resources are also important, but less so
than those of women. These findings of gender asym-
metry in the longitudinal effects of men’s and women’s










ollege London) user on 16 April 2019
resources on housework time also resonate with a lim-
ited number of other studies. They are consistent with
the findings of Evertsson and Nermo (2007) who
showed that, over a period separated by 9 years, in-
creases in Swedish women’s relative resources (in cou-
ples who survived the 9-year gap) were associated with
increases in their male partner’s housework hours. They
also accord with the lagged adaptation thesis (Gershuny
et al., 1994). According to this, men make adjustments
in their unpaid labour over an extended period of time
following changes in their female partner’s employment
status.
We found no evidence for gender deviance neutral-
ization in the longitudinal models. The straightforward
decline in housework hours among those wives whose
human capital increases relative to their husbands, and
the corresponding rise in housework hours among the
group of husbands whose human capital decreases rela-
tive to their wives, underpins this conclusion. In combin-
ation with the fact that over one quarter of husbands in
the group with the lowest human capital relative to their
wives were not in employment (Table 1), this suggests
that unemployed husbands are spending significant
amounts of their time doing housework (although not as
much, of course, as unemployed wives—as also found
by Gough and Killewald, 2011).
While we found no support for gender deviance neu-
tralization, the strong asymmetry of the findings for
wives and husbands does point to an important effect of
gender, as a structure rather than as a ‘trump card’
(Risman, 2011). The fact that wives continue to do
more of the housework even when their resources sig-
nificantly outstrip those of their husbands points to the
key significance of wives’ absolute resources in moving
towards a more gender equal society. Women’s re-
sources evidently constitute a central component of
marital bargaining power, and this conclusion adds em-
phasis to the negative consequences of the gender wage
gap for equality both in the public and in the domestic
sphere. It also lends strong support to feminist efforts to
improve women’s employment opportunities and status
as a strategy for achieving greater gender equality, both
in the private as well as in the public sphere.
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Appendix A
Table A1. Variable means, standard deviations (in brackets), and ranges by survey waves: BHPS 1992–2008
Survey wave groups All years N (all years)
1992–1996 1997–2002 2003–2008
Housework hours Wives 18.9 16.2 15.4 16.8 27,413
(12.6) (10.5) (9.6) (11.1)
1, 99 1, 99 1, 99 1, 99
Husbands 5.9 5.6 5.8 5.8 27,413
(5.5) (5.0) (4.9) (5.1)
1, 65 1, 90 1, 56 1, 90
Housework share (per cent done by women) 74 72 71 72 27,413
(18.9) (19.4) (19.6) (19.4)
3, 99 2, 99 2, 99 2, 99
Human capital Wives 4.9 5.5 6.4 5.6 27,413
(2.1) (2.2) (2.5) (2.3)
1.7, 16.2 2.1, 15.4 2.4, 17.3 1.7, 17.3
Husbands 6.4 6.8 7.6 6.9 27,413
(2.5) (2.5) (2.8) (2.6)
1.6, 17.5 1.9, 18.4 2.5, 22.5 1.6, 22.5
Relative human capital 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.11 27,413
(.20) (.18) (.18) (.19)
0.66, 0.60, 0.58, 0.66,
0.69 0.57 0.52 0.69
Earnings (£/week) Wives 169 190 214 191 21,903
(126) (155) (185) (159)
0, 1,772 0, 4,000 0, 7,879 0, 7,879
Husbands 320 338 365 341 24,934
(224) (270) (264) (255)
0, 5,468 0, 13,386 0, 5,019 0, 13,386
Relative earnings 0.30 0.27 0.24 0.27 20,445
(.35) (.37) (.39) (.37)
1.0, 1.0 1.0, 1.0 1.0, 1.0 1.0, 1.0
Wage rate (earnings/hour) Wives 5.6 6.2 7.1 6.3 20,935
(5.3) (6.4) (7.0) (6.3)
0, 242 0, 390 0, 297 0, 390
Husbands 7.7 8.2 9.0 8.3 24,440
(7.1) (6.8) (7.0) (7.0)
0, 276 0, 225 0, 173 0, 277
Relative wage rate 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.11 19,848
(0.31) (0.32) (0.35) (0.33)
1.0, 1.0 1.0, 1.0 1.0, 1.0 1.0, 1.0
Wife’s age 38 39 41 39 27,413
(10.1) (10.3) (10.0) (10.3)
20, 59 20, 59 20, 59 20, 59
Number of dependent children/household 0.90 0.88 0.90 0.89 27,413
(1.1) (1.1) (1.0) (1.1)
0, 6 0, 6 0, 7 0, 7
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Appendix B
Estimation of the market-related human capital
score
We follow the conventional economists’ procedure
(Heckman, 1979) of combining an estimation of the prob-
ability of an individual’s selection into employment, with
an appropriately adjusted regression estimate of the eco-
nomic value of the various characteristics for those actually
in employment. First, we estimate the quality of jobs by
their market valuation (i.e. the expected wage rate of those
doing them). We construct a Mean Occupational Wage
(MOW) scale of job quality by pooling all the 18 waves of
the BHPS responses (yielding 239,043 observations), ad-
justing hourly wage rates by the Retail Price Index (RPI),
and calculating the mean for each two-digit group in the
standard occupational classification. We take the natural
log of mean income for each occupational category, and
then normalize the result so that the lowest-income job is
scored 0, and the highest is scored 100.
The regression stage of the Heckman procedure esti-
mates the equation:
Lwage ¼ f ðage agesq mow mowsq higra agegr
agrsq medgra agemd agmsq educ1 to
educ6; jobtot1 to jobtot4; unmtot1 to
unmtot4Þ
where:
• lwage is the log of the hourly expected wage rate
• higra is a dummy variable indicating membership of
the top 10 per cent of the MOW scale (83–100), and
medgra indicates membership of the next 30 per cent
(60–82)
• agegr, agrsq, agemd, and agmsq are the products and
squared products of age and the high- and medium-
grade dummies, introduced to allow for differing
age/earnings curves across high-, medium-, and low-
level occupations
• educ1 to educ6 provide dummy variables for, re-
spectively, higher degree, first degree, other tertiary
qualification, A-level, O-level/higher-grade GCSE
and other GCSE/CSE
• jobtot_ and unmtot_ represent, respectively,
months in employment, and unemployment in
each of the 4 years immediately preceding the date
of interview
We estimate the equation using a pooled file of the
full set of 18 waves of BHPS data. Table B1 below
shows the regression coefficients and standard errors for
this estimation. The coefficients from the Heckman re-
gression are used to estimate a predicted value for the
log (expected) wage rate for each respondent for each
wave of the BHPS. Our human capital score is the expo-
nential of that predicted log wage rate.
The selection stage of the Heckman procedure in-
cludes the same variables, plus gender to identify the
equation. Despite the use of gender to identify the selec-
tion equation, which means in turn that the effects of
gender are used indirectly to adjust the size of the coeffi-
cients in the regression stage of the equations, it is not
used directly in the imputation of the Human Capital
Score (HCS), so that any statistical association between
gender and the HCS is a result of associations with the
incidence of values of its component variables. This pro-
cedure diverges from the Heckman (1979) specification
that produces separate estimations for men and women.
These separate estimations have the consequence that es-
timates of the human capital of women with a given set
of characteristics salient to their productivity in the
workplace will always be lower than estimates for men
with identical market-related characteristics. Of course,
this may well reflect the real consequences of discrimin-
atory practices in the workplace. But for a range of
sociological analyses—particularly related to the exam-
ination of the consequence of precisely those discrimin-
atory practices—this specification may not be
appropriate. By building that discrimination into the es-
timations, it becomes impossible to directly compare
the effects of human capital on housework for women
and men.
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Table B1. Human capital estimation equation: BHPS 1991–2008, respondents aged 16–64 (Dependent variable: log hourly
wage)
Variables Regression stage Coefficient Standard error
age Age 0.038 0.001
agesq Age squared 0.000 0.000
mow MOW 0.002 0.000
mowsq MOW squared 0.000 0.000
higra MOW¼ 83–100 (dummy) 0.998 0.064
agegr higra*age 0.044 0.003
agrsq higra*age squared 0.000 0.000
medgra MOW¼ 61–82 (dummy) 0.464 0.032
agemd medgra*age 0.023 0.002
agmsq medgra*age squared 0.000 0.000
educ1 Higher degree (dummy) 0.563 0.010
educ2 First degree (dummy) 0.456 0.008
educ3 Other tertiary (dummy) 0.287 0.006
educ4 University entrance (dummy) 0.180 0.005
educ5 Medium school (dummy) 0.105 0.005
educ6 Low school (dummy) 0.035 0.006
No school qualifications (omitted)
higrahied higra*(educ1 or educ2) 0.055 0.011
medgrahied medgra*(educ1 or educ2) 0.027 0.009
jobtots Months in employment year 3 0.004 0.001
jobtotr Months in employment year 3 0.005 0.001
jobtotq Months in employment year 1 0.004 0.001
jobtotp Months in employment this year 0.005 0.000
unmtots Months unemployment year 3 0.011 0.002
unmtotr Months unemployment year 3 0.004 0.001
unmtotq Months unemployment year 1 0.004 0.001
unmtotp Months unemployment this year 0.008 0.001
wave Year count 1991¼ 1 0.030 0.002
wavesq Wave squared 0.000 0.000
wavemow Wave*MOW 0.001 0.000
wavemowsq Wave*MOW squared 0.000 0.000
constant 0.084 0.026
R 0.655
Selection stage Coefficient SE
women Women 0.057 0.007
age Age 0.004 0.002
agesq Aage squared 0.000 0.000
mow MOW 0.051 0.001
mowsq MOW squared 0.001 0.000
higra MOW¼ 83–100 (dummy) 3.658 0.229
agegr higra*age 0.062 0.011
agrsq higra*age squared 0.001 0.000
medgra MOW¼ 61–82 (dummy) 2.109 0.102
agemd medgra*age 0.051 0.005
agmsq medgra*age squared 0.001 0.000
educ1 Higher degree (dummy) 0.449 0.031
educ2 First degree (dummy) 0.518 0.019
educ3 Other tertiary (dummy) 0.591 0.017
educ4 University entrance (dummy) 0.540 0.011
educ5 Medium school (dummy) 0.522 0.010
(continued)
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Table B1. (Continued)
Variables Regression stage Coefficient Standard error
educ6 Low school (dummy) 0.401 0.017
No school qualifications (omitted)
higrahied higra*(educ1 or educ2) 0.331 0.040
medgrahied medgra*(educ1 or educ2) 0.485 0.029
jobtots Months in employment year 3 0.120 0.001
jobtotr Months in employment year 3 0.012 0.001
jobtotq Months in employment year 1 0.010 0.002
jobtotp Months in employment this year 0.023 0.001
unmtots Months unemployment year 3 0.044 0.003
unmtotr Months unemployment year 3 0.003 0.003
unmtotq Months unemployment year 1 0.007 0.003
unmtotp Months unemployment this year 0.001 0.003
wave Year count 1991¼ 1 0.001 0.004
wavesq Wave squared 0.002 0.000
wavemow Wave*MOW 0.001 0.000
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